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burden-sharing  
Introduction
This  paper  is  interested  in  conceptualising  the  often  raised  issue  of  over-  and 
under-contributing  in  coalition  operations;  that  of  how  and  why  members  of 
complex coalitions2 may be punching above and below their weight, respectively. 
To  this  end,  the  first  section  presents  a  parsimonious  baseline  assumption 
regarding what variables may fundamentally inform coalition burden-sharing, to 
subsequently  discuss  how much each  of  these  are  found to  play  a  role  in  the 
Afghanistan  context.  The  second  section  elaborates  on  this  by  assessing  the 
perception and the interpretation of threats by coalition member countries, related 
to Afghanistan, as this pertains to prioritising other variables within the scheme 
outlined in the previous  section.  The third and fourth sections  then proceed to 
examine and further enrich the existing literature on coalition burden-sharing, and 
provide  further  insights  regarding  the  operations  of  the  International  Security 
Assistance  Force–Afghanistan,  and  regarding  ISAF  member-country  decision-
making;  the  objective  here  is  to  generate  further  refined  assumptions,  that  can 
permit a preliminary assessment of the phenomenon of uneven burden-sharing in 
ISAF, complementing the initial baseline expectations.
Preliminary findings are presented in the fifth section where we offer raw 
evidence  of  the relevance  of  our baseline  assumptions.  In  the sixth  section,  we 
present integrated models of the key variables that play a role in shaping coalition 
contributions, and here two key periods form the focus of this study. On the one 
2 The use of the adjective “complex” may be warranted  given that  the mission in Afghanistan  is  a  joint, 
combined,  interagency  effort,  or  in  other  words  a  multinational  “whole-of-government  engagement” 
integrating IGO/NGO efforts  as well,  and,  at  the same time, as Bensahel  points out,  a coalition within a 
coalition of coalitions (2006).
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hand, we focus on the period of ISAF’s cross-country involvement in Afghanistan, 
following ISAF’s expansion of its operations to the south of Afghanistan in mid-
2006,  up  to  mid-2011,  i.e.  the  official  end  point  of  the  US-led  “surge”  effort, 
intended to provide “Max” or peak leverage  against  insurgents,  in  the hope of 
achieving certain limited objectives in Afghanistan. On the other hand, we similarly 
reflect on the larger time interval of ISAF’s entire lifespan. 
We can subsequently, in the seventh section, draw conclusions as to how the 
distribution of countries with different approaches or “commitment postures” may 
have affected Afghanistan strategy and developments on the ground in the context 
of  the  ongoing  insurgencies.  In  the  final  section,  we  refine  our  initial  baseline 
assumptions and the hypothesised country profiles which were based on the latter, 
with reference to a recently published collection of country case studies by a team 
of scholars (in Hynek and Marton 2011)  which tested our baseline assumptions in 
the cases of some of the countries concerned.
A baseline assessment of coalition contributions
With US President  Obama’s December 2009 speech,  the mission in Afghanistan 
seemed headed once again – after the initial period following the 2001 intervention 
– towards increasing “Americanisation” of its overall project. Whether the allies of 
the United States failed or not to pull their weight over the intervening period may 
seem to be a relevant question in light of this; one that is in fact likely to permeate 
NATO discussions and debates over the Alliance for the foreseeable future.  Yet, 
regarding  Afghanistan,  there  has  been  no  systematic attempt  in  the  academic 
literature  to  identify  the  key  factors  affecting  (i) the  qualitative  and  (both  the 
relative  and  the  absolute)  quantitative  character  of  coalition  member  country 
contributions; (ii) motives explaining their involvement in Afghanistan and in ISAF 
overall;  (iii) the quality of adaptation demonstrated by them once on the ground 
there; and (iv) the role of local factors in individual countries’ areas of operations in 
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shaping outcomes with regards to factors  i-iii. This is all the more puzzling given 
the  extensive  literature  on  coalition  burden-sharing  on  the  one  hand,3 and  the 
current,  considerably high interest in Afghanistan on the other. The above listed 
factors all pertain to assessing if certain countries under-contributed to, or under-
performed in, the mission in a relative sense, and why this may have been the case.
Figure 1.1: The alliance dependence/threat balancing matrix
Alliance dependence
Weak Strong
Threat 
balancing
Weak
“onlookers” “servants”
Stron
g
“mavericks” “strivers”
A simple framework of  assessment,  based partly  on Bennett,  Lepgold  & Unger 
(1994) whose work will be discussed in more detail later on, reckons with alliance 
dependence  and  threat  balancing  as  the  key  structural  motives  factoring  in 
coalition  members’  Afghanistan  policies.  Put  differently,  this  may  suggest  that 
countries either entered Afghanistan, and stayed there over the years, because they 
needed to do so themselves, or because they were compelled to do so by others 
who did. This allows for generating a simple set of hypotheses. These can be best 
3 See Bennett, Lepgold and Unger 1994; Khanna and Sandler 1996; Hartley and Sandler 1999; DiNardo and 
Hughes 2001; Shimizu and Sandler 2003; Auerswald 2004 and 2010; Wilkins 2006; Kreps 2007; Fang and 
Ramsay 2008; Ringsmose 2009; Kreps 2010.
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outlined if one portrays the variations of possible interplays between the factors of 
threat balancing and alliance dependence in a two-by-two matrix (Figure 1.1).
A common-sense hypothesis is that those countries will commit more, both 
in  terms  of  quantity  and  quality,  to  the  coalition’s  mission  that  see  a  need  to 
“balance” threats in Afghanistan, and at the same time value the NATO alliance, or 
the alliance of one or more key NATO countries within the NATO bloc (“strivers”). 
Conversely, the weakest motivation is expected to be observed in cases where both 
threat perceptions and strong alliance dependence are absent (“onlookers”).  The 
more  interesting  cases  are  those  where  either  only  threat  balancing  or  alliance 
dependence appears as an influential factor: that is where theory may need to be 
further formulated and developed regarding the issues of coalition burden-sharing 
and coalition management. It is anticipated, nevertheless, that the majority of the 
coalition may be reminiscent of “servants”.  Some of  the possible candidates  for 
each of these categories, with rudimentary rationalization indicated, are placed in 
Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Hypothesised country profiles
Alliance dependence
Weak Strong
Threat 
balancing
Weak Onlookers
New  Zealand, 
Australia  (non-
NATO members in a 
NATO-led coalition)
Servants
Poland,  Czech 
Republic,  Hungary 
(NATO’s  eastern 
periphery,  grateful 
for  its  inclusion, 
appreciative  of  its 
security guarantee)
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Stron
g
Mavericks
France  (given  its 
tradition of a special 
approach  to  NATO 
cooperation)
Strivers
United  Kingdom, 
Spain  (having  been 
attacked by al-Qaida)
The  alliance  dependence/threat  balancing  framework  offers  the  advantage  of 
parsimony, but it may be impractically constraining at the same time. It is expected 
that  its  dual  categorisation  of  policy  motives  needs  to  be  refined  and 
complemented. One possible objection to the threat balancing/alliance dependence 
framework  is  that  it  is  grounded  in  a  neorealist/materialist  understanding  of 
politics  whereby  only  material  costs  and  benefits,  and  related  pressures  and 
interests,  seem  to  matter  to  state  decision-makers.  In  this  ontology,  there  is 
seemingly no place for intangible values.4
A more dynamic approach may also be necessary. Adaptation to the local 
environment, characterised by challenges of varying degree, is itself demonstration 
of  either  a  genuine  commitment  to  the  Afghanistan  mission,  or  a  lack  thereof. 
Therefore  the  above  hypotheses  can  be  extended  in  scope  to  appreciate  the 
dimension of  time,  including the assumption that  a  strong motivation of  threat 
balancing and strong alliance dependence together dictate better, perhaps generally 
more pro-active, adaptation on the ground. In this respect, “mavericks” (if there are 
any) may also be expected to do well, but specifically when measured against their 
own priorities.
Because genuine adaptation seems to occur in a number of cases, we also 
expect that as demonstrated advantages of this are observed on the ground, a kind 
of collective learning process is induced. But given the less than genuine interest in 
the Afghanistan mission on top political  decision-making levels  in a number of 
countries,  this  learning  process  will  lead  to  only  mixed  results  and  imperfect 
4 Except, perhaps, for the value attached to successfully performing the role of “good servant.”
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emulation of others’ “best” or “relatively good” practices. The primary medium of 
this learning process is expected to be the “coalition owner,” the US, with others 
largely evading responsibility for picking directions in a forward-looking process of 
adaptation.  Thus,  largely  in  response  to  US  calls  for  change  and  guidelines 
regarding  how to  do  it  (“establish  a  Provincial  Reconstruction  Team”,  “deploy 
Operational  Mentoring  and  Liaison  Teams”,  “a  civilian  surge  is  required”), 
countries may follow a logic of appropriateness, and simply go with the pack. In 
other words they may be merely going through the motions in some of the cases. A 
degree  of  institutional  isomorphism  is  hypothesised  therefore,  with  inevitably 
mixed results, under US (coalition owner) leadership. US hegemony in this respect 
is seen as so much of a determining factor that out of all or any “strivers” within the 
coalition, a distinct title, that of “coalition shepherd”, befits the US.
In the overall contribution–adaptation process, in both of its phases, “threat 
balancing” is expected to be of generally lesser significance, compared to “alliance 
dependence”, in a context where often even the coalition shepherd has difficulties 
explaining  the  security  policy  rationale  of  the  Afghanistan  mission,  in  exact 
strategic terms. There are a number of profound, implicitly influential reasons why 
this may be the case. This is elaborated on in the next section.
A conceptual detour: Interpreting threats, costs, and benefits
Cost/benefit calculations do not work in Afghanistan’s case (better than elsewhere), 
for a number of reasons. Examining costs and benefits in terms of threat-balancing, 
that  is,  in  terms  of  how ISAF  paticipants’  policies  and  strategy  affect  different 
threats and, consequently, the security of the coalition’s members certainly ought to 
be part of any such calculation. If there is a net decrease in threat levels, this may be 
deemed a positive result; if there is a net increase, it is a negative result. If a threat is 
eradicated, that clearly constitutes success.
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This may be characterised as a disaggregated approach to evaluating the 
Afghanistan mission as one which can be defined as aiming to tackle several, non-
interlinked threats at the same time – for example those of terrorism and narcotics. 
This  approach  faces  major  epistemological,  conceptual,  and  methodological 
challenges, however. Several of these are outlined below:
 Whether the Afghanistan mission is a “success” or a “failure” should also be 
assessed  holistically,  not  only  in  disaggregated,  reductionist  analyses  of 
whether al-Qaida operatives are (still or again) present in Afghan territory, 
or of how much (more or less) heroin is traded on the world market from 
Afghan sources.
 Counter-productivity is possible; contributions to, and by, coalitions serving 
a cause cannot be automatically assumed to be a net positive (e.g. in the case 
of mutually incompatible goals, such as winning hearts and minds of the 
locals and destroying poppy fields).
 Not  only  current  threat  levels  and  associated  indicators  but  also  threat 
scenarios need to be borne in mind. These may well suggest a clearer threat–
policy  nexus  than  empirical  data  at  present.  For  example,  the  threat  of 
terrorism would likely grow if al-Qaeda could again gain a stable foothold 
and operate training camps in eastern and southern Afghanistan.
 Afghanistan cannot be treated as an isolated unit of analysis, as though it 
would exist in a vacuum. When answering whether there are vital interests 
at stake, one has to take a regional outlook and ask whether involvement is 
necessary in Afghanistan’s entire region as such.
 ISAF’s is a coalition effort that only works if the entire coalition puts overall 
sufficient  effort  into  achieving  common  objectives.  The  interdependent 
nature  of  coalition  members’  achievements  is  such  that,  in  terms  of 
investments  and  pay-offs,  coalitions  simply  do  not  work  as  shareholder 
companies may do.
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 Simplistic cost/benefit  analyses do not work as other motives play a role. 
Foreign policy role conceptions, state and national identities, principles of 
solidarity,  humanitarianism,  notions  of  a  responsibility  to  protect,  biases 
about Afghanistan, its  history,  its  people,  and the wider  region, casualty-
aversion, organisational interests, domestic political needs, public attitudes 
towards the United States, and many other factors weigh in, and together 
determine a country’s Afghanistan policy.
The most  important  “threats”  –  that  is,  consistently  securitised  issues –  related to 
Afghanistan are those of jihadist terrorism, originating from prospective training 
camps and potential “state capture” there upon a partial or complete takeover of 
power by elements of the jihadist movement, and the heroin trade and its source, 
i.e.  poppy  cultivation  in  Afghanistan.  That  these  be  deemed  threats  requires 
subscribing to their securitisation which, as much as a difference in terms of this 
can be claimed to exist, is somewhat more of a controversial issue in the case of the 
drugs trade, in regard to legalisation and medicalisation which are sometimes put 
forward as possible solutions to it (see e.g. Senlis, 2007). 5
The possible overall counter-productivity of the Afghanistan mission is an 
empirically relevant concern, and, as a result, an intensely politicised issue in the 
case of both terrorism and the drugs trade. Concerns are raised in the discourse 
related to terrorism whenever jihadist militants themselves name Western troops’ 
presence in Afghanistan as one of their reasons for waging war against the West, in 
their propaganda messages. In the case of the drugs trade, for a long time in the 
wake of the 2001 intervention, poppy cultivation expanded in the country, and this 
5 Subscribing to an approach whereby one only takes into account threats relatively consistently securitised 
also entails not considering poliomyelitis as a threat, whereas this could be debated in the case of Afghanistan. 
One of the only few remaining hotspots of poliomyelitis, after it has been eradicated in much of the world, is 
the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Armed conflicts there significantly hamper vaccination efforts 
which would require multiple rounds of oral vaccination to each children in need of being immunised. Given 
that this makes the eradication of the disease difficult in the current circumstances, the poliomyelitis virus 
could eventually pose a risk even to populations distant from the region, with likely carriers being members of 
the Afghan and Pakistani diasporas, travelling to locations around the globe by air and otherwise.
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trend also elicited criticism, given the perception that ISAF and the West in general 
were making this problem worse themselves somehow.
Nevertheless Afghanistan’s supposed “negative externalities”, in the form of 
the  “output”  of  terrorism  and  drugs,  can  be  measured  in  some  concrete 
dimensions. Key indicators to look at in terms of “threats” to be balanced therefore 
can be identified. Such might be the number of citizens of a particular country who 
die  or  are  wounded  in  terrorist  attacks  by  jihadist  militant  groups  targeting 
specifically citizens of that country; or the number of people experiencing opiate-
related  health  problems  undergoing  treatment  in  a  particular  country,  or  the 
amount  of  opiates  intercepted  at  the  borders  of  a  particular  country.  Yet 
measurements in these dimensions are not sufficient for a thorough assessment of 
either threat levels or of a country’s motives in its Afghanistan policy. Moreover, 
they also fail to capture how the threats concerned really work.
In order to shed more light on the transnational threat mechanisms involved, 
Marton (2009) uses the concept of “issue-related security complexes” to describe 
“webs or systems of security relationships within which interdependence is higher 
than in general”, connected not to “sectors” as in the analysis of Buzan, Wæver & 
de Wilde (1998), but to “issues” that would be hard to locate within any and just 
one  of  Buzan,  Wæver  and  de  Wilde’s  sectors.  Take  the  example  of  jihadist 
terrorism: an issue/threat that matters in the political, the military, the societal, and 
even the economic sectors of analysis. Marton therefore proposes that: 
The description of issue-specific security complexes is necessarily more than 
the  adding  up  of  issue-specific  patterns  of  [negative  externalities  emerging 
from zones of armed conflict]: one also needs to describe the mechanisms that 
dynamically  shape  [negative  external  security  effects],  by  explaining  how 
qualitative, quantitative and directional shifts (…) occur, and what predictive 
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models we may use in analysis, to foresee similar shifts in the future. (Marton, 
2009: 97)
Both in the case of jihadist terrorism and the drugs trade, “carriers” of these threats, 
as well as “mechanisms” deflecting/re-directing the flows related to them, can be 
identified, with some overlap between the two concepts. Carriers may be human 
networks (in a practical sense), and structural conditions and ideas (in an abstract 
sense). An example of “deflecting mechanisms”, in the case of the drugs trade, is 
how mid-stream interdiction or at-source eradication efforts in counter-narcotics 
operations  may  replace  trade  and  smuggling  routes  as  well  as,  even,  the 
geographical sources of production, just as this occurred to the Golden Triangle, 
with some of the production of opiates migrating from there to Afghanistan over 
the long term. Law enforcement or overseas counterterrorist actions can work in 
similar ways by dislocating, replacing, and diverting the human networks as well 
as the financial flows behind terrorism. Even anti-terrorism, the defensive approach 
to tackling terrorism, can have such effects by raising the costs of attacking certain 
targets as a result of which other targets will be preferred by the terrorists (Enders 
& Sandler, 2006: 20).
The  possible  counter-productivity  of  counternarcotics  activities  in  
Afghanistan has already been highlighted, and indeed this is why calls for restraint 
appeared, and US counternarcotics efforts were redirected from crop eradication to 
interdiction and to the targeting of bulk traders of opiates. In addition, in light of 
the deflecting mechanisms discussed above, the questionable overall productivity of 
counternarcotics activities needs to be highlighted as well, especially on the supply 
side  and,  in  general,  “up-stream”.  The  trade  may  be  merely  deflected  from  a 
current source to a replacement source, should counternarcotics efforts lead to (thus 
Pyrrhic) success.
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It is in the case of terrorism that one observes some of the most interesting 
and perplexing  effects:  a  weak  state  in  Afghanistan,  where  Western  troops  are 
bogged down, works as a kind of militant magnet and deflects threats from Europe, 
North America and elsewhere in the broader Middle East, even as it paradoxically 
also leads to threats, in other cases, in just these locations. Thus there is deflection 
taking  place  in  the  direction  of  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan,  as  well  as  negative 
externalities suffered from there, at the same time.
The following example should be considered as useful illustration of this. 
There has been, in recent years, an “exodus” of German (including German-born 
and ethnically German) Islamists to border areas of Pakistan in Waziristan. Among 
them were the members of the so-called “Sauerland cell”, some of whom went to 
Pakistan to  fight  in  Afghanistan on the side  of  the Islamic  Jihad Union.  In  the 
retelling  of  one  of  the  members  of  the  group,  they  did  not  perform  up  to 
expectations in attacking a US Army base in eastern Afghanistan, and in trying to 
mount ambushes with other guerrillas (ET, 2009). They were told by their comrades 
that for them in Europe it might be easier to carry out an attack. This turned out not 
to be the case, as German police eventually obtained timely information on their 
activities and raided their hideout in the autumn of 2007, before they could carry 
out the bombings that they were planning.
Attributing motives to terrorists is no easy analytical challenge, either. The 
members of the Sauerland cell may have been especially upset, based on their own 
account, by the kidnapping of a Muslim man and German citizen, Khaled el-Masri, 
in  Macedonia,  by  the  CIA  (Musharbash,  2009).  El-Masri  was  confused  with  a 
known terrorist operative going by the same name; the incident happened in 2003. 
Nevertheless, this was certainly not at the root of all of the animosity of the members 
of the Sauerland cell towards the US, Western culture, and even Germany, and the 
incident seems rather but a trigger that pushed them over the brink. This sort of 
puzzle was recently inconclusively discussed in a debate over whether “Lady Gaga 
or the occupation in Palestine” is more of a source of frustration and grievance for 
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Islamists in general  (Hegghammer,  2010).  While this is  not necessarily the most 
convenient way to frame the underlying issues, it is illustrative of the difficulties of 
identifying “root causes” behind terrorism. The lack of true comprehension is also 
evident in the debate in Britain over whether a quick exit from Afghanistan would 
embolden or silence radicals rather, there and elsewhere. And it also manifests in 
the case of the US where drone strikes in Pakistan led to a debate over whether it is 
worth killing known al-Qaida operatives at the cost of killing civilians in collateral 
damage, thereby letting Pakistani militant organisations gain a salient recruiting 
tool.
Theoretically speaking, the only viable, remaining assumption is a modest 
one.  It  is  assumed that (i)  threat  balancing might  be a  weak,  but on its  own clearly  
insufficient, motive to be present in Afghanistan for a country experiencing public health  
and crime effects of the transnational drugs trade.6 At the same time it is assumed that 
(ii)  threat  balancing  may  be  sufficient  cause,  even  on  its  own,  for  involvement  in  
Afghanistan  for  a  country  facing  the  prospect  of  terrorist  attacks that  could  receive 
critical logistical aid from militant safe havens in Pakistan’s border regions: the safe 
havens that may be expected to relocate to the other side of the border, should the 
Afghanistan mission be abandoned, and should it turn into a clear failure.
Having  said  that,  given  the  uncertainty  over  threat  mechanisms,  and 
considerations of possible counter-productivity, these motivations may not amount 
to more than ambivalence and uncertainty regarding whether the threats concerned 
are effectively “balanced” or, to the contrary, enhanced by the Afghanistan mission. 
This  may  result  in  an  unsure  identity  for  countries  participating  in  the  ISAF 
coalition,  but  generally tending towards the box for  “servants,”  in terms of  the 
categories introduced in  Figure 1.1. Framing this in a political economy language, 
the concern is that the Afghanistan undertaking is an “impure (that  is,  a partly 
6 Perhaps it would be better to write off the possibility of a counternarcotics motive overall, but this could 
seem to contradict an existing consensus that this motive does and should play a role. That consensus itself 
may be only present on the surface, and results from a number of factors. Examining this possibility, however, 
is not part of the investigation undertaken in this article.
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excludable and rival) public good.” Furthermore, the possibility that instead of only 
public and private goods the mission may also produce public and private “bad,” 
also exists, and is reckoned with. Hence the strategic ambivalence of the mission 
which is only mitigated by the conviction (as long as it exists) of the merits of the 
mission  on  the  part  of  the  coalition  shepherd,  the  U.S.,  and  other  countries’ 
“alliance dependence” towards it.
Refining theory: further factors informing a coalition’s prospects
As  already  indicated,  there  is  a  number  of  factors  co-determining  a  country’s 
investment  of  effort  in  coalition  undertakings  of  various  sorts.  Foreign  Policy 
Analysis deals with these as a by now distinct field of research, and a number of 
excellent  studies7 have  already  dealt  specifically  with  the  issues  of  “coalition 
burden-sharing” and “intra-alliance conflicts” in the past. For further insights, this 
literature  shall  now be discussed with the  Afghanistan case  in  mind;  the latter 
novel in some respects, while it at the same time conforms to existing expectations 
in others.
The  existing  literature  tells  us  that  countries  join  coalitions  in  order  to 
achieve at least partly common or compatible goals. Doing this in alliances, they 
spread costs and risks, and they gain additional legitimacy for certain actions, while 
they  pool  resources  together  to  collectively  dispose  of  quantitatively  and 
qualitatively enhanced capabilities  and augmented capacities.  From an alliance’s 
collective  perspective,  an  individual  coalition  member’s  contribution  can  be 
important in making available a missing or “niche” capability or by adding critical 
mass to a coalition. Any new member that joins an alliance is generally likely to 
increase the legitimacy of collective action, and it mitigates the burden to be shared 
by the coalition, by taking some of the costs and risks. An important special case is 
when a coalition member becomes vital, because physical access or crucial sections 
7 See footnote #3 for a list of relevant references.
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of logistical routes to an area of operations may be granted exclusively through its 
territory.  A  good  example  of  this  sort  of  bottleneck-country  is  Egypt,  with  its 
control over the Suez Canal, vital for operations in the Gulf Region and beyond. 
Pakistan has a similarly exceptional role in providing the vital artery of logistical 
support to the Afghanistan mission.
There are potential downsides to building coalitions. Maintaining them in 
the face of intra-alliance quarrels may be costly itself. To set common objectives, 
individual member countries may need to compromise over their original goals. 
This is just what a preventive approach to intra-alliance conflict resolution might 
entail, and it translates into costs for the coordinating/compromising party.
An often  considered  lesson  of  coalition  operations  involving  the  US  and 
other countries is that capabilities may not necessarily be enhanced in collective 
action.  For this reason,  in January 2002,  Donald Rumsfeld famously stated,  ‘the 
mission must determine the coalition,  and the coalition must not determine the 
mission.  If  it  does,  the  mission  will  be  dumbed  down  to  the  lowest  common 
denominator, and we can't afford that.’ Rumsfeld was secretary of defence at the 
time of saying this, and he spoke about US interests in light of the experiences of 
the Kosovo campaign of  1999 and the  2001 intervention  in  Afghanistan.  In  the 
Kosovo  campaign,  the  US  Department  of  Defense  complained  about  having  to 
wage “war by committee” in the NATO framework, while supplying the larger 
part of key assets and capabilities to the mission. Subsequently, in Afghanistan, the 
US was initially not particularly keen on accepting offers of cooperation from its 
NATO allies  who even  invoked  Article  5 of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty,  at  least 
nominally showing their readiness to provide support.
In his above quoted statement, Donald Rumsfeld disregarded advantages of 
increased  legitimacy.  Contrary  to  this,  the  1994  US  intervention  in  Haiti  is  an 
excellent example,  from long before Kosovo, of when the US consciously multi-
lateralised a foreign mission, with no particular military rationale, simply to gain 
added legitimacy in the eye of its  domestic  population as well  as in the eye of 
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Haitians (Kreps,  2007).  Later  on this  became an important consideration behind 
accepting and even urging more allied contributions in Afghanistan.
Generally  destabilising  factors  in  coalitions  revolve  around  security 
dilemmas  and  mistrust.  On  the  basis  of  Snyder’s  (1997)  and  Wilkins’  (2006) 
concepts,  the former stem from the possibility of  abandonment by allies  and of 
subsequent entrapment in a losing alliance, while the latter tends to develop (i) if 
burden-sharing is inequitable within a coalition, (ii) if commitments are not kept in 
good faith  or  (iii) if  genuine,  meaningful  consultation does  not  take  place  over 
contentious issues, such as corrective adjustments to originally equitable burden-
sharing arrangements.
Theoretical clues for understanding ISAF burden-sharing
The  following  initial  observations  can  be  made  about  ISAF,  and  coalition 
operations in Afghanistan, in regard to what has been presented in the overview of 
the literature thus far.
 The military  capability  gap plays less  of  a  role  in the generally  low-tech 
counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign underway in Afghanistan. This does 
not  mean  that  it  does  not  play  a  role  at  all.  But  over  time,  the  human 
resources  that  are  most  vital  in  COIN  could  theoretically  be  used  with 
similar efficiency across the coalition, if there was even and full commitment 
to the mission. Nevertheless such deficiencies of the ISAF coalition as the 
lack of adequate and sufficient long-range and intra-theatre airlift capacities 
on the part of many of its members, as well as other issues, can be mentioned 
in this context.8
 For an ideal counterinsurgency-force to population ratio, adding a greater 
mass of troops would have been a requirement, but, beyond struggling to 
8 NATO’s Strategic Airlift  Interim Solution (SALIS) and Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) have been the 
organisation’s two main responses to this challenge so far.
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generate  sufficient  force  even  at  their  Summit  meetings,  only  partially 
succeeding in this, NATO members have been and are mostly expecting the 
Afghan  security  forces,  police  and  army,  to  fill  in  the  gaps  eventually, 
leading to a full transition to an Afghan-led effort.
 Commitments made are generally kept in good faith. The major problem is 
not  mistrust  because  of  a  lack  of  respect  for  the  principle  of  pacta  sunt  
servanda,  but  that  the  commitments  made  may  have  been  insufficient. 
Contributions  were  generally  made not on the basis  of  exigencies  on the 
ground, but in accordance with what domestic politics tolerated without too 
much debate.
 The  legitimacy  of  the  mission  and  issues  of  risk-sharing  are  closely 
connected.  Especially  in  Europe,  there  are  fears  that  the  Afghanistan 
campaign  may  increase  the  risk  of  terrorism  to  European  countries,  by 
radicalising a segment of the continent’s Muslim population, and this has a 
de-legitimising effect on the mission.
For added explanatory power, beyond what has been discussed so far, two more 
key works will be mentioned in this context: Fang & Ramsay (2007) and Bennett, 
Lepgold & Unger (1994).
In  their  game-theoretic  take on the challenge of  coalition burden-sharing, 
Fang and Ramsay show how lead nations end up having to „pay” (in a multiple 
sense) more within coalitions of rationally acting state parties. Their conclusions are 
valid within the framework of a two-state, two-stage model. NATO is not a two-
state alliance, but Fang and Ramsay’s study may still be relevant in regard to ISAF, 
for  the  following reasons.  Fang and Ramsay use  the  assumption that  there  are 
potential external partners as available outside options for the lead nation; that it is 
not only the more traditional partners that a coalition effort’s initiator can turn to. 
Therefore Fang and Ramsay’s model appears useful in considering how a NATO-
led,  but  effectively  coalition-of-the-willing type alliance,  such as ISAF,  currently 
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depends on US lead on the one hand, and on key contributions from non-NATO 
countries such as Australia on the other. Fang and Ramsay find,
...  an  unusual  relationship  between  ally  contributions  and  the  flexibility  of 
alliance  configurations.  Specifically,  allies  contribute  more  in  loose  bipolar 
conditions than in tight bipolar conditions, but do not contribute enough in the 
multi-polar setting to deter search (Fang & Ramsay, 2007: 4).
In other words, if  (i) the initiator’s search costs (the chances of finding alternative 
partners) decrease significantly, while (ii) the general environment of the coalition 
questions the raison d’être of a coalition, traditional allies will probably not be loyal 
contributors.
Yet, however convincing this may sound in the light of what can be observed 
in Afghanistan, directly reading Fang and Ramsay’s conclusions onto the case of 
ISAF remains problematic for several reasons. Is Australia a “non-traditional” ally 
for  the US,  the lead nation in  ISAF?  Are  East-Central  European states,  such as 
Lithuania,  the Czech Republic,  Poland,  Hungary or Romania “traditional” allies 
because today they are NATO member states? Can we claim that “search costs” 
have  really  diminished –  even though there  still  are  not  enough „boots  on the 
ground” in Afghanistan? In the end, one cannot help but quit trying to use a two-
state,  two-stage model  for interpreting the whole spectrum of challenges in the 
Afghanistan mission. One more aspect of ISAF operations does connect to Fang and 
Ramsay’s  conclusions,  however.  Truly  vital  national  security  threats  are  not 
entirely clearly perceived to be originating from Afghanistan at this point, by many 
of the key audiences concerned, and this affects governments’ decisions regarding 
contributions, as discussed in the previous sections.
An  alternative,  empirically  based  inquiry  into  the  dynamics  of  coalition-
building and maintenance can be found in Bennett, Lepgold and Unger’s study of 
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the  Gulf  War  of  1991,  previously  used  here  for  formulating  the  baseline 
assumptions of the paper. Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1994) examined the role of 
five  factors  (three  external,  two  domestic)  in  influencing  the  level  of  burden 
undertaken  by  some  of  the  participants  of  the  coalition  that  liberated  Kuwait. 
Mildly reconfiguring their list of key factors, the external factors are:
 the balance of threat, as detailed previously;
 relative size (of a given country within a coalition): A country’s contribution 
may show an inverse relationship with relative size within the coalition. This 
insight  is  derived  from alliance  theory  which,  partly  based  on  neorealist 
considerations, predicts that smaller countries are especially likely to enter 
alliances  merely  in  order  to  thus  “contract  out”  the  provision  of  their 
security, and that they subsequently minimise their contributions as much as 
possible,  even in  the face of  demands for  more  equitable  burden-sharing 
from their part by allies (Ringsmose, 2009; Kimball, 2010);
 alliance  dependence:  This  some would  refer  to  as  “alliance  importance”, 
given that the latter is a less pejorative, more value-neutral expression – also 
keeping Kreps’ (2010) proposition, that we think of NATO as an “iterated 
game” of “security cooperation”, in mind. The interpretation of “alliance” 
here shall be sufficiently broad to include dependence on not just the NATO 
alliance, but on the United States as first among formally equals, both within 
and without the ranks of NATO: countries like Australia or New Zealand 
may  come  to  mind  as  examples  from  without  NATO,  of  countries 
strategically relying on good relations with the US.
The important domestic variables that Bennett, Lepgold and Unger list are:
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 the room for manoeuvre enjoyed by the executive (“executive autonomy”) 
within a polity in formulating and implementing foreign policy free from 
institutional checks and balances;
 organisational interests, such as those of the military, key state agencies, the 
executive, political parties, and others.
This  is  a  theoretical  framework  for  explaining  the  contributions  of  not  only  an 
initiator and its traditional partner, as in Fang and Ramsay’s two-state framework. 
Therefore it can be more conveniently used to evaluate contributions to a multi-
state coalition where roles are more diverse and the initiator’s partners are more 
differentiated.
Preliminary findings
Some  raw  empirical  data  are  presented  in  Table  I,  showing  a  selection  of  the 
countries involved in ISAF, and a snapshot of their troop contributions as of April 
2010  to  ISAF,  that  is,  before  the  completion  of  the  US  surge  which  skewed 
indicators further in favour, or to the detriment, of the US.
Table I: Allied contributions in light of population size and GDP.
Troop 
contribution 
in ISAF (as of 
mid-April 
2010); ranking 
indicated  in 
brackets α
Population 
size;  ranking 
indicated  in 
brackets β
GDP  size 
(2009)  in 
million  USD; 
ranking 
indicated  in 
parentheses γ
People  per 
one  soldier 
deployed  in 
ISAF; ranking 
indicated  in 
parentheses
Million GDP 
dollars  per 
soldier 
deployed; 
ranking 
indicated  in 
parentheses
%  share  in 
ISAF’s 
overall 
force; 
ranking 
indicated  in 
parenthesesδ
Australia 1,550; (10) 22,337,272; 
(10)
997,201; (8) 14,411.14; (8) 643.355; (15) 3.45; (5)
Canada 2,830; (6) 34,096,000; (9) 1,336,427; (7) 12,048.05; (7) 472.235; (12) 4.36; (1)
Czech Rep. 460; (16) 10,512,397; 194,828; (16) 22,853.03; (16) 423.539; (11) 1.61; (12)
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(13)
Denmark 750; (13) 5,557,709; (16) 309,252; (14) 7,410.27; (3) 412.336; (9) 3.18; (7)
Estonia 155;  (19) 1,340,021; (21) 19,123; (21) 8,645.29; (4) 123.374; (1) 3.11; (8)
Finland 100; (21) 5,359,500; (17) 238,128; (15) 53,595; (21) 2381.280; 
(21)
0.44; (20)
France 3,750; (4) 65,447,374; (4) 2,675,951; (3) 17,452.63; (10) 713.586; (16) 0.76; (18)
Germany 4,665; (3) 81,757,600; (2) 3,352,742; (2) 17,525.74; (11) 718.701; (17) 3.29; (6)
Hungary 335; (17) 10,013,628; 
(14)
129,407; (18) 29,891.42; (18) 386.289; (8) 1.45; (13)
Italy 3,300; (5) 60,325,805; (6) 2,118,264; (5) 18,280.54; (12) 641.898; (14) 1.36; (14)
Lithuania 145; (20) 3,339,227; (20) 37,254; (20) 23,029.15; (17) 256.924; (6) 1.35; (15)
Netherlands 
(before  the 
gvt’s fall)
1,885; (8) 16,608,750; 
(12)
794,777; (9) 8,811; (5) 421.632; (10) 3.29; (6)
New Zealand 225; (18) 4,367,700; (19) 117,795; (19) 19,412;  (14) 523.533; (13) 1.88; (11)
Norway 470; (15) 4,880,000; (18) 382,983; (13) 10,382.97; (6) 814.857; (18) 2.31; (10)
Poland 2,515; (7) 38,192,000; (8) 430,197; (11) 15,185.68; (9) 171.052; (3) 1.28; (16)
Romania 1,010; (12) 22,215,421; 
(11)
161,521; (17) 21,995.46; (15) 159.921; (2) 1.24; (17)
Spain 1,270; (11) 46,030,109; (7) 1,464,040; (6) 36,244.18; (19) 1152.787; 
(20)
0.71; (19)
Sweden 485; (14) 9,354,462; (15) 405,440; (12) 19,287.55; (13) 835.959; (19) 3.71; (14)
Turkey 1,795; (9) 72,561,312; (3) 615,329; (10) 40,424.12; (20) 342.802; (7) 0.22; (21)
United 
Kingdom
9,500; (2) 62,041,708; (5) 2,183,607; (4) 6,530.7; (2) 229.853; (5) 4.35; (2)
United States 62,415; (1) 309,218,000; 
(1)
14,256,275; (1) 4,954.22; (1) 228.411; (4) 4.16; (3)
α Source: ISAF-P (2010a).
β Source:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_population,  as 
accessed on 1 May 2010.
γ Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2010 [IMF 2010].
δ Source: IISS
To point out improportionality in burden-sharing, it may be sufficient to highlight 
the  United  States,  the  Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom,  and  their 
exceptionally  great  contributions,  specifically  in  regard  to  the  ratio  of  soldiers 
deployed to population (rows for the three countries are marked in bold).
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Another possible, raw measure is calculating rank correlations in the various 
dimensions in which “relative size” can be interpreted, for example by comparing 
GDP  rankings  to  troop  contribution  rankings.  Spearman’s  rank  correlation 
coefficient shows strong positive rank correlation for GDP and troop contribution 
rankings (ρ = 0.916). Especially Finland (not a member of NATO) seems to be an 
outlier here in a negative sense (having the 15th largest GDP and the smallest troop 
contribution). Overall, the post-Cold War or post-communist NATO-member East-
Central  European  countries  are  all  major  contributors  in  nominal  terms; 
remarkably, non-NATO members Australia and New Zealand are generally pulling 
according to their GDP-proportional weight even while some NATO members do 
not. At the same time, that there are only a few outliers, and rank correlation is so 
strong,  may reveal  something  about  peer  expectations  within the  alliance,  as  it 
seems  plausible  to  assume  that  what  is  observed  may  be  more  than  mere 
coincidence; even bearing in mind that  Table I  provides but a somewhat random 
and arbitrary snapshot.
Unfortunately,  the various measures  of  troop contributions do not tell  us 
much about non-military contributions which are much more difficult to assess and 
might alter findings concerning the strength of the relative size hypothesis. Of the 
countries  in  Table  I,  the UK, Germany,  and Italy  had special  responsibilities  for 
many  years  in  the  domains  of  counternarcotics,  police  training,  and  the 
organisation  of  Afghanistan’s  judiciary,  respectively.  These  countries  as  well  as 
others such as Sweden, Norway, or Canada are important aid donors. As to smaller 
countries,  despite  being  relative  dwarves,  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  and 
Lithuania  led  Provincial  Reconstruction  Teams  in  different  Afghan  provinces 
(Logar, Baghlan, and Ghor, respectively), at the same time as they were providing 
Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs), trainers, and in other ways 
contributing  to  the  coalition  effort.  As  one  observer  notes,  there  is  a  need  to 
‘recognize  the  degree  to  which  so  many  countries  have  mission-critical 
responsibilities in Afghanistan’ (‘Anan’, 2010).
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Furthermore, the “number of people per one soldier deployed” and “GDP 
dollars per one soldier deployed” may be more appropriate measures of whether a 
country is  “punching” below or above its  weight.  Spain,  along with Finland,  is 
identified as an under-contributor in this respect. Their “deviant” behaviour might 
call for an explanation. A generally more interesting finding is that contrary to the 
thesis that small countries exploit the great in alliances (Ringsmose, 2009; Olson, 
1966), in the case of ISAF, frequently the opposite can be observed, with relative 
dwarves  such  as  the  Czech  Republic,  Lithuania,  or  Hungary  falling  below  the 
arithmetic  mean  of  the  GDP-dollars-to-soldiers-deployed  ratio  while  France, 
Germany, or Spain provide in this comparison relatively less. Nevertheless any true 
test of the tenets of Alliance theory (with a capital ‘A’) should not be restricted to the 
ISAF alliance (with a small ‘a’) in an age when parallel UN, CSDP, OSCE, NATO, 
and other  national  missions  as  well  as  general  NATO and CSDP requirements 
impose diverse and interdependent burdens, across the globe, on most of the states 
concerned.  Especially  with  the  increasingly  prominent  idea  of  a  “security-
development  nexus”  in  mind,  it  should  be  noted  that  some  even  contemplate 
including countries’ share of international development cooperation as an input in 
aggregated burden-sharing assessments (Hartley & Sandler, 1999: 668). To posit a 
likely  explanation  for  what  has  been  observed,  the  relatively  small  may  be 
compensating for their generally cost-minimising approach in Alliances by doing 
more  in  Alliances’  individual  missions,  be  this  under  pressure  or  by their  own 
choice.
Towards an integrated model of ISAF burden-sharing
To develop an integrated model of the heretofore discussed variables, with relative 
size  disregarded  for  now,  and  alliance  dependence,  threat  balancing,  domestic 
constraints  and  organisational  interests  remaining  to  be  incorporated,  in  earlier 
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work9 we relied to a large extent on Auerswald’s  integrated model (Auerswald, 
2004: 643)10 for further simplification in the interest of successful operationalisation. 
The  last  two  of  Bennett,  Lepgold  and  Unger’s  five  variables,  i.e.  domestic 
constraints and organisational interests, are thus presented as “executive strength” 
and “public support.”
The  decision-making  moment  of  the  model  we  conceptualised  as  one  in 
which states already in the mission area as part of the coalition decide how to move 
on from an initial commitment posture (CP)11 to one of three options (O1-3) available 
to  them,  given  the  mediating  variables’  influence.  This  largely  conforms to  the 
2006-2011 period in  Afghanistan,  the period starting from ISAF’s  completion of 
expanding its area of operations across Afghanistan, up to the envisioned end-point 
of the US-led “surge”.
CPs  were  either  strong,  medium,  or  weak  to  begin  with  (CP-Major;  CP-
Medium; CP-Minor). The options available are a small set. Being the first country to 
withdraw from Afghanistan without a particularly salient prior contribution was 
not apparently part of the considered set of options, as it may have been seen as 
cost-prohibitive specifically in terms of (ally) reputation costs. O1 was to maintain 
one’s current level of commitment even if this was criticised by peers and especially 
by the  coalition initiator.  O2 was  to  incrementally  increase  commitments  as  the 
9 In the opening chapter of the forthcoming book: Marton, Péter – Hynek, Nik, eds. (2011) ‘Statebuilding in 
Afghanistan: Multinational contributions to reconstruction’. London: Routledge.
10 Auerswald builds an integrated model of some of Bennett, Lepgold and Unger’s component variables, one 
that  is  well-suited to  analysing potentially even  the case  of  Afghanistan,  albeit  it  was devised to  recover 
determinants of NATO countries’ policy towards Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. In Auerswald’s model 
„alliance dependence” does not receive as great emphasis as in this article, given the context in which it was 
developed. The latter variable, important in Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1994), is dealt with essentially as but 
one  component  of  Auerswald’s  factors  affecting  a  country’s  propensity  to  partake  in  the  provision  of  a 
collective good. This is one of the reasons why we propose an altered integrated model here.
11 This may be measured in quantitative terms, e.g. of the number of troops deployed, as well as by qualitative 
measures such as the absence or presence of caveats restricting what types of engagement a country’s troops 
may become involved in, or the difficulty of the geographical and social terrain which significantly vary across 
different areas of operations.
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situation on the ground deteriorated and demands for this were made by peers. O3 
was  to  make  a  highly  visible  commitment  with  a  firmly  fixed,  albeit  possibly 
renegotiable deadline, and then exit, thus avoiding major criticism in the wake of 
an acknowledged, significant contribution (this we term a “noble exit”). Since such 
policy still leaves the coalition to its fate in the mission area, this option may have 
been more available to countries with CP-High to begin with.
Figure 1.3: An integrated model of decision-making related to contributions to 
ISAF, configured to the context in Afghanistan circa 2006-2011.
Given how vaguely  understood it  tends  to  be  for  the  reasons  presented  in  the 
second section, threat balancing (TB) is seen as a factor which either had or had not 
influence.  Alliance  dependence  (AD)  is  assumed  to  be  either  high  or  medium, 
based on the premise that countries which are not dependent on the alliance of the 
states making up ISAF, in one meaningful way or another, would not be there in 
Afghanistan at all. Public support for operations in Afghanistan is generally low 
across  the  coalition’s  members,  Poland and Turkey  possibly  being  some of  the 
“worst cases” from the point of view of a decision-maker intent in these countries 
MARTON AND HYNEK COALITION BURDEN-SHARING IN ISAF
on contributing to the common effort in Afghanistan (based on data in Kreps, 2010: 
195).
The integrated model, presented in Figure 1.3 then assumes that if TB plays a 
role and/or if AD is strong, only O2 and O3 are available as options, with executive 
strength making the difference. If the executive is challenged on Afghanistan policy 
and in danger either of fragmenting or of being outflanked by a combination of the 
opposition, O3 may provide an honorary exit, saving face among peers. 
At the time of devising the model, only the Netherlands and Canada seemed 
to qualify as plausible examples, with the reservations that in the Netherlands’ case 
the governing coalition behind the fourth cabinet of Jan Peter Balkenende collapsed 
in  February  2010  not  only  related  to  the  Afghanistan  mission,  having  been  a 
fractious grand coalition from its inception, and that for the Canadian leadership of 
PM Stephen Harper the Netherlands’  announced withdrawal  of  troops possibly 
facilitated avoiding a renegotiation within NATO of the finality of the 2011 end-
date for  Canadian troops’  deployment  in  Kandahar province.12 O1 and O2 were 
assumed to  be  the  only  available  options  for  the rest  of  the coalition,  with  the 
definitive capping of commitments,  as O1 implies,  rather unlikely in the current 
circumstances,  and hypothesised here  as  an option for  the weak executive  of  a 
country whose alliance dependence  is  medium only.  As an overall  determining 
variable,  US  hegemony  matters,  however,  and  if  mid-2011  turns  out  to  be  a 
strategic  watershed  moment,  with  troop  reductions  beginning  in  the  Afghan 
theatre,  the US will  eventually lead the gradual wrap-up of coalition operations 
itself.
12 It also needs to be borne in mind that the Netherlands and Canada are not planning to completely move past 
a military role, given their involvement in the training of Afghan National Security Forces. At the same time, 
other aspects of their involvement will also continue past mid-2011; for example, in the wake of its mission in 
Uruzgan province, the Netherlands returned to the north of Afghanistan, to Kunduz province, with a police 
training  mission.  This  is  why  the  O3  option  in  the  scheme  is  eventually  indicated  as  an  honorary,  but 
potentially only partial exit.
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The integrated model may, by Spring 2011, be determined to have partially 
inaccurately  predicted the dynamics preceding mid-2011:  it  is  found that  in the 
period spanning mid-2010 and Spring 2011, out of the twenty countries included in 
Table I, only nine increased their troop contributions significantly, that is, with over 
one-hundred troops. Nine increased their troop contributions only by a token or 
not  at  all,  and  two  countries  even  decreased  their  contributions  [Norway  and 
Denmark]  (ISAF-P  2011).  Canada,  whose  role  in  Kandahar  was  already  set  to 
expire, actually increased its contribution by Spring 2011. Depending on whether 
one  accepts  small  increases  as  a  “growing  effort”,  one  may  arrive  at  different 
assessments  of  the  coalition’s  performance  in  force  generation.  The  tokenism 
observed, and that an outgoing contributor such as Canada still needed to fill in 
gaps,  may  suggest  either  profound  deficiencies  in  this  respect,  or  that  the 
expectation that even the coalition leader was making preparations for eventually 
downsizing its effort, affected coalition partners’ behaviour. Moreover, as indicated 
before,  these  quantitative  changes  do  not  reflect  what  may  have  changed  in 
qualitative  terms;  for  example  any  new  forms  of  contributions  that  may  have 
appeared in individual countries’ portfolios.
In light of recent research by Ali Ashraf (2011), a rethinking of the integrated 
model in Figure 1.3 may be warranted to reflect the operation of key variables since 
the beginnings of ISAF (not only for 2006-2011).  This requires,  instead of the  in  
medias res approach of our model above, explaining why CPs High, Medium, or 
Low  emerged  as  outcomes  in  the  first  place  (the  starting  points  of  our  first 
integrated  model).  In  Ashraf’s  own  model  (2011:  75),  alliance  dependence  and 
balance of threat play a key role at  t0, just as in our  Figure 1.1, but in addition to 
these, the collective-action dilemma is referenced as well. The effect of this mix of 
three components is then mediated by executive strength to implement a rational 
contribution to the coalition’s  operations,  and is  further  differentiated by public 
opinion  and  the  absence  or  availability  of  military  capability  to  deliver  a 
contribution  seen  as  necessary  further  intervening  variables.  Ashraf’s  model 
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challenges  our  assumptions  on the  count  of  relative  size  informing  a  country’s 
approach to coalition operations. However, if it were to function this way, ISAF’s 
empirical experience would be a paradox of small countries doing nominally more, 
in terms of GDP dollars to soldiers deployed, than several of the countries with 
greater potential in this respect, as noted before.
We therefore  argue that  a  reconfiguration of  Ashraf’s  model  is  necessary 
with  reference  to  Ashraf’s  otherwise  correctly  inserted  intervening  variable  of 
“military  capability.”  The consideration  of  the  latter,  a  country’s  set  of  existing 
capabilities, should be moved to the front, that is, to the left of the scheme, since it 
is  well-known  within  the  Alliance  and  is  therefore  the  origo of  intra-alliance 
calculations rather than a derivatively considered circumstance. For just this reason, 
writing of NATO’s burden-sharing problems, Thies (1989: 364) makes the point that 
countries with larger defence programs and defence bureaucracies are best suited 
to collect and make sense of such information, thus making the most out of calling 
on their smaller alliance partners to contribute more as allies. This endeavour may 
be hindered somewhat by small countries’ continuous endeavour to decrease their 
defence  budgets.  However,  exactly because of  thus potentially  undermining the 
security relationship with, and the existing security guarantees from, great-power 
partners, small countries may be eventually more effectively pressured, and at the 
same time more inclined, to offer up what they have on those occasions when this 
is  marginally more important,  in the Alliance’s  missions.  Moreover,  beyond the 
jointly set capability development goals and coordinated capability development 
efforts  within  NATO,13 themselves  significant  in  illustrating  why  the  capability 
filter  should  be  included  ahead  of  the  loop  in  an  integrated  scheme  of  the 
contribution  process  (contrary  to  Ashraf’s  scheme),  military  capabilities  are 
13 Institutionally, capability development within NATO is coordinated by Allied Command Transformation’s 
Capability  Development  Directorate  in  cooperation  with  the  Joint  Analysis  and  Lessons  Learned  Center 
(JALLC).  The  Directorate  is  organised  into  five  divisions.  Its  responsibility  covers  the  Capability 
Development Process from the identification of capability development needs to overseeing implementation 
within the Alliance (NATO 2012).
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sometimes  developed  specifically  in  the  context  of  ongoing  missions,  with  the 
purpose of optimising contributions from partners,  in cooperation with coalition 
leaders  such  as  the  United  States.  One  of  many  possible  examples  of  this  is 
Hungary  whose  special  operations  capability  was  created  with  much  U.S. 
assistance in the wake of 11 September 2001 – a capability now used in Afghanistan 
(Wagner 2011); more recently the U.S. provided financial and material support to 
Hungary for the development  of its  Joint  Terminal  Attack Controller  capability, 
exactly in order  to  further  augment its  military contribution to  the Afghanistan 
mission (Index 2012).
Figure 1.4: An integrated model of ISAF burden-sharing in the long run (based 
on Ashraf 2011).
In addition, countries  limit and openly state ‘ambition levels’  within the NATO 
Alliance,  to  thus  reflect  the  degree  to  which  they  are  ready  to  use  existing 
capabilities in foreign missions.
Therefore  in  our  integrated  model  we suggest  the  following sequence  of 
events  under  the  effect  of  the  variables  specified  in  Figure  1.4. A  demand  for 
contributions is made by a coalition’s shepherd with such parameters as available 
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capabilities  and  ambition  levels  in  mind  to  countries  that  had  in  some  form 
expressed a readiness to consider such a demand with reference to allied solidarity 
and shared threat perceptions (as we concluded in the second section, in most cases 
it  will  be  alliance  dependence  informing  their  expression  of  support  in  ISAF). 
Whether a demand by the coalition shepherd is satisfied is then further mediated 
by  interrelated,  reciprocally  effective  variables,  such  as  executive 
strength/autonomy,  budgetary  constraints,  public  opinion,  and  the  existence  or 
absence of elite consensus which (its absence) may translate into a strong challenge 
by the opposition against making a certain contribution.
(Collective-action dilemmas based on) “relative size,” not taken into account 
above, may rather be expected to matter in terms of how genuinely and proactively 
a country is adapting under the circumstances it finds in Afghanistan, and as to 
how genuinely it is striving to achieve common goals. A relatively small country 
that  does  not  have  a  defining  impact  on  coalition  strategy  and  cannot  see  its 
contribution as making a defining impact on the outcome of the coalition’s efforts 
may  not  strive  so  much  in  this  respect,  even  if  it  contributes  to  the  mission 
significantly, above what would be its proportional share of the burden. This is the 
aspect  of  a  country’s  contribution  that  a  purely  rationalist/materialist  model 
interested  mostly  in  the  quantitative  dimension  of  a  country’s  contribution  to 
coalition operations, will tend not to capture. Altogether, we therefore propose the 
alternative integrated model of ISAF operations presented in Figure 1.4.
Insights regarding Afghanistan strategy
The  discussion  of  variables  determining  and  mediating  the  level  of  coalition 
contributions in terms of forces and assets generated for the mission, and in terms 
of meaningful strategic adaptation demonstrated on the ground, holds relevance 
for  Afghanistan  strategy.  In  and  of  itself  it  is  reminder  that  the  assessment  of 
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individual  country  contributions,  as  in  a  vacuum,  is  a  superficial  intellectual 
exercise that does not result in a meaningful overall assessment of the Afghanistan 
mission. Neither is it possible to isolate the impact individual PRTs are making in 
their  respective  environments  in  the  wider  context  of  their  operations  that  is 
dynamically changing.
A typology of different approaches to coalition policy, and to the mission in 
Afghanistan,  by  individual  participant  countries,  allows  one  to  conceptualise  a 
possibly  fundamental  flaw in  the  way  the  mission  was  handled  in  the  period 
between 2006 and 2009.  This  is  the period preceding the US-led “surge,”  when 
ISAF had already extended its area of operations to the entire country, and when 
the mounting challenge of the ongoing insurgencies had already been realised. In 
regard to this period, and on the basis of the matrix in Figure 1.1, it is presented as a 
final  baseline assumption that  largely “servants” deployed to areas  to the west, 
northwest,  and  north,  perceived  as  the  generally  safer  areas,  while  mostly 
“strivers”,  and  the  “coalition  owner”,  that  is,  the  US,  deployed  to  the  south, 
southeast, and east, perceived as hotbeds of the various insurgencies. For the sake 
of parsimony, the concept of “mavericks”, the Kabul area, or ISAF’s five Regional 
Commands are not used to complicate the scheme presented in Figure 1.5.
Figure 1.5: The distribution of servants and strivers in Afghanistan.
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The strategic implications are manifold. Inasmuch as the above assumptions are 
correct,  in the north the less well-resourced and, over time, less pro-actively re-
configured coalition contributions may have created ample ground for forays by 
insurgents,  and eventually for the establishment of their stable foothold in these 
areas, relying on, as well as having organised, local constituencies. As a caveat it 
needs to be added that beyond how much individual PRTs may have strived for 
success,  the  importance  of  raw  military  strength  and  spending  power,  and 
differences in this respect, also need to be considered. As of end-2010, 42 out of the 
46  ISAF  combat  battalions  were  still  concentrated  in  southern  and  eastern 
Afghanistan, leaving the north less well reinforced (Peter, 2010).
Figure  1.6 shows  the  change  of  the  security  situation  across  Afghanistan 
based on data from the United Nations Department of Safety and Security, between 
2006  and  2010.  The  ominous  spread  of  the  dark  patches  indicates  how  much 
circumstances deteriorated over these years. The contrast is strong, but at the same 
time  it  is  important  to  note  that  “very  high  risk”  areas  appeared  almost 
immediately in the wake of ISAF’s expansion to the south and the east, over the 
course of 2006. Meanwhile, the key change is that “medium” and “high risk” areas 
gradually emerged in patches in the north and west as well, possibly in part as a 
result of the way areas of operation were allocated to different countries, and the 
degree to which different geographical regions were reinforced with combat units.
Figure 1.6: The changing security situation 2005-2010. (Source: the authors’ work, 
on the basis of United Nations Department of Safety and Security maps)
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Findings concerning individual countries
Recent research and case studies, to be published in an upcoming volume, permit 
us to re-evaluate some of the assumptions outlined in the previous sections, and to 
test the country-specific hypotheses presented in Figure 1.2.
As already demonstrated, non-NATO members Australia and New Zealand 
are making a comparatively proportional contribution to ISAF operations, contrary 
to the proposition that they may be involved only as “onlookers” since they are 
non-NATO members. So much may be said, even if, as William Maley concludes, 
‘success in Uruzgan [where Austrialian troops are operating] offers no guarantee of 
success in Afghanistan as a whole’ (Maley, 2011: 135), and, as Hoadley points out, 
‘New Zealand officers  with  field  experience,  are  inclined to  [believe  that]  good 
outcomes … reflect creative adaptations to the varied and ever-changing security 
and  development  environments  that  characterize  Afghanistan’  (Hoadley,  2011: 
150).
East-Central European NATO-members’ efforts, including in leading PRTs 
in different provinces of Afghanistan, also need to be more carefully assessed. Their 
experience may be more varied than the “servant” characterisation may suggest. In 
their study, Marton and Wagner conclude that ‘Hungary, proud of its nominally 
major contribution to ISAF ’s efforts in Afghanistan, was never really eager to do 
more  than  just  go  through the  motions’  (Marton  & Wagner,  2011:  208).  Račius 
contends  that  ‘Lithuania  never  even  considered  seriously  engaging  in  the 
provincial  reconstruction  works’  (Račius,  2011:  264).  Generally  confirming 
expectations, Kulesa and Górka-Winter describe Poland as beyond ‘a long history 
of adapting to the changing demands of the United States and other allies within 
NATO and ISAF in a  consciously responsive manner’  (Kulesa  & Górka-Winter, 
2011: 223). Meanwhile, as to the Czech Republic, Hynek and Eichler posit that ‘an 
explanation of the Czech government’s motivation in this matter is that there was a 
successful  internalization  of  US  and  NATO  strategic  narratives  concerning  the 
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Allied  necessity  to  reconstruct  Afghanistan  (…)  seen  as  natural,  right  and 
legitimate’ (Hynek & Eichler, 2011: 238). 
Foust discusses France, the potential “maverick” in light of  Figure 1.1.  He 
refers to the French approach as different from the U.S. approach in being more 
“pragmatist,” since “the French do not believe they can create large-scale social 
change.” In terms of results, however, he debates the relevance of this, and notes 
that  while  “the  methods  differed,  but  the  results  (…)  were  much  the  same.” 
Moreover, France did what it did with a view “to remain a major actor within the 
alliance,  but  to  do  so  in  responsible,  strategic  manner“  (Foust,  2011:  99-100). 
Therefore he concludes that France “can be placed right along the boundary of the 
‘mavericks’  and ‘strivers’  boxes  (…) The French military can properly  be called 
‘strivers’  in  the  sense  that  it  exudes  a  strong sense of  coalition (…) the French 
government can be called ‘mavericks’ in the sense that it independently sees value 
in participating in the war in Afghanistan” (Foust, 2011: 98). The one real maverick 
overall, contrary to prior expectations, seems to be Turkey. Vamvakas outlines why 
the  Turkish  contribution  may  be  amongst  those  least  fitting  the  alliance 
dependence/threat balancing framework; given how the ruling AKP government is 
just  as  interested  in  state  and  nation-building  in  Turkey  through  the  policy  it 
implements vis-à-vis Afghanistan as it is in building special ties with Afghanistan, 
Central Asia and beyond, through its participation in ISAF.
Several genuine “strivers” are also identified in the volume. Anthony King 
generally  confirms  the  hypothesis  concerning  the  United  Kingdom,  while  the 
Netherlands,  and  possibly  even  Germany,  the  latter  sometimes  misleadingly 
defined  as  the  “weakest  link”  in  northern  Afghanistan,  may  qualify  in  this 
category, as Rietjens and Behr show in their respective chapters. Behr emphasises 
that Germany eventually ‘did adjust its ISAF contribution … in the face of overtly 
hostile public opinion, a lack of experience, severe institutional limitations and a 
long-standing aversion to the use of military force (…) beginning to resemble more 
of  a  “striver”  than  a  “servant”’  (Behr,  2011:  58-59).  Given  that  the  German 
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contingent is the most significant in the area of operations under ISAF Regional 
Command-North, this clearly was significant change. It has come belatedly, by a 
time by which insurgents may have established themselves a strong foothold in the 
northern provinces. Nevertheless Germany’s reconsideration of its earlier caveats 
and  rules  of  engagement  allowed  the  coalition  to  adapt  to  the  changed 
circumstances  in  the  north  with  a  less  profound reorganisation  than  otherwise 
would have been needed.
The crucial assumption regarding the early weaknesses of ISAF’s allocation 
of  responsibilities,  incorporated  in  Figure  1.5,  based  on  the  categorisation  from 
Figure 1.1, is thus also seen as largely justified. Behr emphasises that ‘the German 
position in the first few years of the ISAF engagement might be classified as that of 
a “servant”’ (Behr, 2011: 58). Salonius-Pasternak, for his part, claims that ‘Finland 
only very recently acknowledged the changing security challenges in Afghanistan’ 
(Salonius-Pasternak, 2011: 187), and the experience of others, for example Hungary 
and Norway, seem similar in light of what Marton and Wagner and Harpviken add 
in their respective chapters. 
As was expected,  the materialist  ontology behind the matrix in  Figure 1.1 
does not capture additional possible motives informing countries’ policies, such as 
Norway’s  conflicted commitment to live up to expectations as a “peace nation” 
even in the Afghanistan environment. As Kristian Harpviken notes, ‘The ambiguity 
of the [PRT] concept … not only [allows] divergent narratives between nations, it 
also allows multiple narratives to coexist within the same nation’ (Harpviken, 2011: 
170).
To  conclude,  Figure  1.7 summarises  the  findings  as  they  fit  the  matrix 
presented in  Figure 1.1,  and these can be compared to the hypothesised country 
profiles presented in Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.7: Hypothesised country profiles
Conclusions
In spite of the many problems discussed in this paper, one does observe a certain 
level of strategic coherence in the coalition’s approach to burden-sharing. Much 
behind-the-scenes  work  as  well  as  overt  diplomacy  is  taking  place  within  the 
coalition  to  this  end,  led  by  the  coalition’s  shepherd,  the  US.  This  increased 
interaction in general, together perhaps with a role played by transnational policy 
networks and epistemic communities, is important in maintaining the cohesion of 
the  coalition,  and  the  striving  for  more  coherence  in  its  efforts.  Through  the 
shepherd’s  and its  key partners’,  that  is,  strivers’,  diplomatic  efforts,  as  well  as 
through  key  networks,  intense  messaging  is  taking  place,  directed  at  coalition 
partners’ elites and publics, and this may result in the high correlation observed 
between GDP and troop contribution rankings, regarding which we presented data 
earlier on.
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Alliance dependence is the factor seen as playing the most significant role in 
the generally  constructive  atmosphere  that  one can observe on the surface  even  
behind the scenes, in how relative size and variables connected to the domestic polity 
and  domestic  politics,  i.e.  executive  autonomy/strength  and  organisational 
interests,  play their mediating role. The effect  of domestic politics is moderated, 
while  relative  size,  contrary  to  the  general  assumption  of  alliance  theory,  is 
demonstrated to be playing the inverse of its conventionally expected role: in fact, it 
is just this conventional, or commonly observed, effect of calculations related to it 
that  the extensive  involvement  of  minor participants  in  the ISAF coalition may 
serve to compensate.
In the decision-making moment conceptualised by the paper’s first of two 
integrated models,  that  is,  in the period between 2006 and mid-2011,  especially 
between end-2009 and mid-2011, it is hypothesised and partly found to conform to 
empirical data that, regardless of whether a country’s contribution was relatively 
major, medium, or minor at the start of the period, a slowly growing effort could be 
expected from its  part;  however,  inadequacies  have also  been  identified  in  this 
respect. Size of contribution is, meanwhile, not enough in and of itself to gauge a 
country’s  importance,  and the general  role conception of  ISAF participants,  and 
how much they strive, or, conversely, merely try to serve or stand by, also plays an 
important  role  in  determining  outcomes;  beyond  the  enormously  important 
variable of the dynamically changing local circumstances in Afghanistan, and the 
challenges they pose.
It  is  therefore  argued  that  while  placing  servants  and  onlookers  with 
nominally/proportionally appropriate contributions in the relatively safer areas of 
operations  may have seemed a safe  or prudent  approach as of  mid-2006,  in an 
interdependent strategic environment this itself may have provided incentives to 
adversaries  to  take  the  fight  to  beyond  their  earlier  areas  of  activity  within 
Afghanistan.
MARTON AND HYNEK COALITION BURDEN-SHARING IN ISAF
References
‘Anan’  (2010)  Reader  comment  to:  “Discussing  European  Efforts  at  Afghan 
Reconstruction”  by  Joshua  Foust. 
(http://www.registan.net/index.php/2010/11/11/discussing-european-efforts-
at-afghan-reconstruction/#comments) (Accessed 19 November 2010).
Ashraf,  Ali  (2011)  The  politics  of  coalition  burden-sharing:  The  case  of  the  war  in  
Afghanistan, doctoral thesis, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh.
Auerswald,  David P.  (2004)  Explaining Wars of  Choice:  An Integrated Decision 
Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo. International Studies Quarterly 48(3): 631–
662.
Behr, Timo (2011) Germany and Regional Command-North: ISAF ’s weakest link?, 
in Hynek and Marton, 42-64.
Bennett, Andrew; Lepgold, Joseph  & Unger, Danny (1994) Burden-Sharing in the 
Persian Gulf War. International Organisation 48(1): 39–75.
Bensahel, Nora (2006) A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation Against 
Terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29, 35–49.
Buzan, Barry; Wæver, Ole  & de Wilde, Jaap (1998)  Security: A New Framework For  
Analysis. Boulder: Colorado/ London: Lynne Rienner.
DiNardo, R. L.  & Hughes, Daniel J. (2001) Germany and Coalition Warfare in the 
World Wars: A Comparative Study. War in History 8(2), April 2001: 166-190.
ET (2009)  German terror  suspects  targeted  'US  soldiers  in  Europe'  –  Summary. 
Earth  Times,  10  August 
(http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/news/280866,german-terror-suspects-
targeted-us-soldiers-in-europe--summary.html)  (Accessed  on  12  October 
2010).
Enders,  Walter  & Sandler,  Todd  (2006)  The  Political  Economy  of  Terrorism. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
MARTON AND HYNEK COALITION BURDEN-SHARING IN ISAF
Fang, Songying  & Ramsay, Kristopher W. (2007) Burden-sharing in Nonbinding 
Alliances. Article awaiting publication. (http://www.polisci.umn.edu/~sfang/
alliances%20JCR%202.0.pdf) (Accessed on 23 June 2008).
Foust, Joshua (2011) France in Kapisa: A combined approach to statebuilding, in 
Hynek and Marton, 88-103.
Harpviken,  Kristian (2011)  A peace nation in the war on terror:  the Norwegian 
engagement in Afghanistan, in Hynek and Marton, 157-173.
Hartley,  Keith  &  Sandler,  Todd (1999)  NATO Burden-Sharing:  Past  and Future. 
Journal of Peace Research 36(6): 665-680.
Hegghammer,  Thomas  (2010)  Lady  Gaga  vs.  the  Occupation.  Foreign  Policy 31 
March 
(http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/03/31/lady_gaga_vs_the_occup
ation) (Accessed on 8 September 2010).
Hoadley, Stephen (2011) The New Zealand PRT experience in Bamyan Province: 
assessing political legitimacy and operational achievements, in Hynek and 
Marton, 139-156.
Hynek, Nik & Eichler, Jan (2011) Post-decisional and alliance-dependent: the Czech 
engagement in Logar, in Hynek and Marton, 226-242.
Hynek, Nik & Marton, Péter (eds) (2011) Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Multinational  
contributions to reconstruction. London: Routledge.
IMF (2010)  Report for Selected Countries and Subjects. In: World Economic Outlook 
Database, April 2010. 
Index (2012) Az USA 3 milliárd forinttal támogatja a Magyar Honvédséget. Index, 
24  January  2012, 
(http://index.hu/kulfold/2012/01/24/az_usa_3_milliard_forinttal_tamogatja_a
_magyar_honvedseget/)  (Accessed on 2 February 2012).
ISAF-P (2010a)  ISAF  Placemat,  NATO.  16  April 
(http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/Apr-16-2010-
placemat.pdf) (Accessed on May 8, 2010).
MARTON AND HYNEK COALITION BURDEN-SHARING IN ISAF
ISAF-P (2010b)  ISAF  Placemat,  NATO.  6  August 
(http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/100804%20Rev
%20Placemat.pdf) (Accessed 7 September 2010).
ISAF-P (2011)  ISAF Placemat,  NATO.  4  March 
(http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/PLACEMAT.MARC
H%2004..pdf) (Accessed 10 April 2010).
Jentleson,  Bruce  (1992)  The  Pretty  Prudent  Public:  Post  Post-Vietnam American 
Opinion on the Use of Military Force. International Studies Quarterly 36(1): 49-
74.
Khanna, Jyoti,  & Sandler, Todd (1996) NATO burden-sharing: 1960-1992.  Defence  
and Peace Economics 8(1): 101-120.
Kimball,  Anessa  L.  (2010)  Political  survival,  policy  distribution,  and  alliance 
formation. Journal of Peace Research 47(4): 407.
King,  Anthony  (2011)  Operation  Herrick:  the  British  campaign  in  Helmand,  in 
Hynek and Marton, 27-41.
Kreps,  Sarah  (2007)  The  1994  Haiti  Intervention:  A  Unilateral  Operation  in 
Multilateral Clothes. Journal of Strategic Studies 30(3): 449-474.
Kreps, Sarah (2010) Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why 
Public  Opinion Hardly Matters  for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan. 
Foreign Policy Analysis 6(3): 191–215.
Kulesa,  Łukasz,  and  Górka-Winter,  Beata  (2011)  From  followers  to  leaders  as 
‘coalition servants’:  the Polish engagement  in Afghanistan,  in Hynek and 
Marton, 212-225.
Maley, William (2011) PRT activity in Afghanistan: the Australian experience,  in 
Hynek and Marton, 124-138.
Marton,  Péter  (2009)  Grand  Theory  meets  the  Afghan  case:  State  failure  and  state-
building in an age of opaque policy-making, doctoral thesis, Budapest: Corvinus 
University of Budapest, August 2009.
MARTON AND HYNEK COALITION BURDEN-SHARING IN ISAF
Marton,  Péter  & Wagner,  Péter  (2011)  ‘Hungary’s  involvement  in  Afghanistan: 
proudly going through the motions?’, in Hynek and Marton, 192-211.
Musharbash, Yassin (2009) Jihadists Describe Hatred of US as Reason for Terror 
Plot.  Der  Spiegel,  12  August 
(http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,642047,00.html) 
(Accessed on 12 October 2010).
NATO  (2012)  Capability  Development (CAP  DEV),  NATO  Allied  Command 
Transformation.  Date  not  indicated. 
(http://www.act.nato.int/index.php/organization/hq-
sact/structure/capability-development) (Accessed on 22 February 2012).
Olson,  Marcus  &  Zeckhauser,  Richard (1966) An Economic Theory of  Alliances. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 48(3): 266–79.
Peter, Tom A. (2010) In deadly Kandahar, skepticism over gains cited in Afghan 
war  review.  Christian  Science  Monitor,  16  December, 
(http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/1216/In-deadly-
Kandahar-skepticism-over-gains-cited-in-Afghan-war-review/(page)/2) 
(Accessed on 18 December 2010).
Račius, Egdūnas (2011) Trials and tribulations of the Lithuanian participation in the 
NATO ISAF mission, in Hynek and Marton, 261-277.
Rietjens, Sebastiaan (2011) Between expectations and reality: the Dutch engagement 
in Uruzgan, in Hynek and Marton, 65-87.
Ringsmose,  Jens  (2009)  Paying  for  Protection:  Denmark's  Military  Expenditure 
during the Cold War. Cooperation and Conflict 44(1): 73-97.
Salonius-Pasternak,  Charly  (2011)  Finland’s  ISAF  experience:  rewarding, 
challenging  and  on  the  edges  of  the  politically  feasible,  in  Hynek  and 
Marton, 174-191.
Senlis Council (2007) Poppy for Medicine Licensing poppy for the production of essential  
medicines:  an integrated counter-narcotics,  development,  and counter-insurgency  
model  for  Afghanistan.  June  2007 
MARTON AND HYNEK COALITION BURDEN-SHARING IN ISAF
(http://www.poppyformedicine.net/documents/Poppy_for_medicine_in_Afg
hanistan) (Accessed on 12 October 2010). 
Snyder, J. (1997) Alliance Politics. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Shimizu, H.  & Sandler, T. (2003) NATO Peacekeeping and Burden Sharing: 1994-
2000. Public Finance Review 31(2): 123-143.
Thies, Wallace J. (1989) Crises and the Study of Alliance Politics.  Armed Forces &  
Society, Spring 1989, 15(3): 349-370.
Vamvakas, Petros (2011) Turkey’s ISAF mission: a maverick with strategic depth, in 
Hynek and Marton, 243-260.
Wagner, Péter (2011) 9/11 és a Magyar Honvédség. Nemzet és Biztonság, 2011/8: 64-
71.
Wilkins, Thomas Stow (2006) Analysing Coalition Warfare from an Intra-Alliance 
Politics  Perspective:  The  Normandy  Campaign  1944.  Journal  of  Strategic  
Studies 29(6), December: 1121-1150.
